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What is Art? Toward a Legal Definition
by
LEONARD D. DUBOFF*
Introduction
In order to understand and deal with the numerous issues arising in
the relatively new field of art law, it is important to develop a legal defini-
tion for "art." To accomplish this goal, several areas of the law where
the definition has traditionally been important, such as copyright, cus-
toms, state and federal moral and economic rights statutes, and state
consignment statutes will be surveyed.
It will be demonstrated that in the areas of copyright, customs, and
state consignment statutes the legal definition of art is quite broad, en-
compassing a wide variety of works and requiring very little originality
or creativity. The common thread running through these areas, particu-
larly in copyright and customs, is a requirement that objects being
claimed as art have some minimal amount of original authorship at-
tached to them.
In copyright, this requirement branches out into a definitional crite-
rion which is very expansive for non-useful objects, but which becomes
more restrictive when useful objects are involved. Relatively recent case
law in the California and New York courts has further expanded what
will be considered a work of art for copyright purposes when dealing
with a useful object.
The customs definition of art has been substantially expanded by the
new Harmonized Tariff System. These areas of expansion will be criti-
cally evaluated and the probable effect of the expansion on future litiga-
tion will be considered.
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State consignment statutes will be summarized from a definitional
perspective. This Article will show that most of these statutes contain an
expansive definition of art.
The area of artists' moral and economic rights presents a definitional
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the statutes can be seen as a wel-
come new addition to the field, protecting and articulating rights for art-
ists which were once only present in countries such as France. On the
other hand, the statutes tend to take an extremely cautious and restric-
tive approach to defining art, which is probably attributable to the new-
ness of the field.
I
The Copyright Definition
A. Introduction
Property has been described as consisting of a "bundle of rights."
For the visual artist, one of the most important parts of that "bundle" is
undoubtedly the copyright.' Copyright protection allows a creator to
profit economically from his or her investment of time, skill, and energy
by giving a limited monopoly in his or her work.2
Copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression." 3 The Copyright Act (Title 17,
U.S.C. section 102) includes visual art under its umbrella of protection.
The legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates that its protection
is extended to to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" which en-
compass "graphic art and illustration, art reproductions . . . maps,
charts, globes, and other cartographic works for use in advertising and
commerce, and 'applied art.' "' "Applied art" includes all "pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work.., embodied in useful articles, regardless of
factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation and the poten-
tial availability of design protection."5
Additionally, section 102 makes a distinction between works of ap-
plied art which are eligible for copyright protection and works of indus-
trial design which may be patented, but are not available for copyright
protection. 6 House Report Number 94-1476 set forth the distinction that
" 'pictorial, graphic and sculptural works' include 'works of artistic
I. L. DuBOFF, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 189 (1984) [hereinafter NUTSHELL].
2. Id.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (citing Historical and Revision Notes, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong. (1976)).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilita-
rian aspects are concerned.' "' The now-familiar test, which has become
the focal point of much litigation, is stated in the House Report as
follows:
[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
Consequently, because the Copyright Act only extends protection to
original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium and encompasses
works of applied art but not works of industrial design, it is crucial to
establish: (1) exactly what is an original creation for copyright purposes,
and (2) if the work is a useful article, whether it is protectible applied art
or unprotectible as an industrial design under copyright law.
In attempting to reach a legal definition of art for copyright pur-
poses, the courts have focused on two basic issues:
1. Originality. A completely non-useful work will be granted a copy-
right if a minimal amount of originality is demonstrated. If, however,
the piece is a derivative work, then a "substantial" amount of original-
ity will be required in order to gain a copyright.
2. Separability. If the work is a useful article, the court will look at
whether or not it is applied art or industrial design. As will be demon-
strated later, the separability test has traditionally discriminated
against certain "modern" designs. Recent case law in New York and
California, however, has demonstrated an effort by the courts to elimi-
nate or lessen that discrimination by looking to the creator's intent,
rather than simply looking to the end product.
As will be illustrated later, the courts are constantly walking a tightrope.
On the one hand, the courts attempt to grant copyright protection to
creations which are original and, if part of a useful object, separable.
While on the other hand, they try to avoid extending copyright protec-
tion to a creation that is nothing more than a copy, which would stifle
independent creativity.
B. The Originality Requirement
In a copyright sense, "originality" is not synonymous with the "nov-
elty" requirement for patent protection. The originality requirement in
copyright means that the work must be independently created. Simply
put, this means that the work must not have been copied from another
work. The originality requirement does not mandate that the work be
unique. In other words, a work will not be denied copyright protection
7. Id.
8. Id.
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merely because it is substantially similar to a work previously created, so
long as the work has not been copied from the earlier work.9
1. Non-derivative Works
If the work for which copyright protection is sought is non-deriva-
tive, then the Copyright Office will require only a minimal amount of
originality. However, as Atari Games Corp. v. Oman 'o demonstrates, it is
sometimes difficult to meet even the minimal amount of originality re-
quired. In that case, a video game company brought an action challeng-
ing the Register of Copyrights' decision not to grant it a copyright on its
video game BREAKOUT. The Copyright Office refused to register the
copyright, claiming that the work did not contain the requisite minimal
amount of originality. The court had to determine whether the video
game was a work of authorship, or just the result of the minimally re-
quired amount of creative expression. The court stated that "whether a
particular work reflects a sufficient quantum of creativity to satisfy the
copyright laws is not susceptible to bright line rules or broad princi-
ples."" The decision on originality "requires the exercise of informed
discretion" and, consequently, deference must be given to the Copyright
Office's decision on these matters.' 2 For this reason, the court deter-
mined that the standard of review in such cases is whether or not the
Copyright Office has abused its discretion.13
The video game which Atari attempted to copyright was a form of
"ball and paddle game" on a video screen much like ping-pong or tennis.
Atari sought to have the audiovisual display registered for copyright pro-
tection. The court pointed out that "the BREAKOUT display consists
of common geometric shapes, four bands of colored rectangles, and three
tones heard when the 'ball' strikes various objects on the screen."' 4 The
court noted that a sequence of images might contain so little in the way
of a particularized form of expression as to be only an abstract idea por-
trayed in a non-copyrightable form.' 5
Thus, the court concluded that BREAKOUT was little more than a
stock description of a paddle and ball game, inseparable in any principle
manner from the idea which it embodied: "This is quite distinct from
video games which feature expressive and artistically creative renditions
9. NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 198.
10. 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988).
I1. Id. at 1205.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1206.
15. Id. at 1206-07.
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of an idea and which thereby merit copyright protection."' 6 The court
mentioned in passing that the fact that the game was profitable and pop-
ular was irrelevant. The court stated that the copyrightability of a work
is defined "not by its financial returns or public favor, but rather by its
originality and creativity."' 7
Atari stands for the proposition that a common design devoid of any
expressive or artistic creativity will be denied a copyright on the ground
that it is merely an abstract idea in a non-copyrightable form. Rejection
of the copyrightability of a rearranged common design indicates a desire
on the part of the courts not to discourage innovation and creativity by
granting a copyright on too broad a category of objects.
This "common design" test for originality was utilized in Towle
Mfg. Co. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Ltd.'8 The controversy arose in this
case over a decorative mouth-blown, hand-cut crystal baby bottle. The
defendant manufactured a pressed glass, machine-made decorative baby
bottle which the plaintiff alleged had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in
their "Galway" baby bottle, a hand-cut crystal item. In discussing the
originality requirement, the court stated that "although independent cre-
ation is necessary to establish originality, 'there need not be invention in
the sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty,' the degree of
originality required has been described as 'modest,' 'minimal,' and at a
'low threshold.' "19
The plaintiff, in designing its baby bottle with preexisting cutting
designs which were in the public domain, failed to meet the modicum of
originality necessary to obtain a copyright: "The numerous exhibits
presented at trial make it clear that each of the five glassware cuttings
utilized by Galway in its baby bottle design is in common usage in the
glassware and crystal industries, and each has apparently been so for a
long period of time."2 ° The court stated, however, that "the mere bor-
rowing of elements from previous works will not defeat copyrightability
as long as the author has devised a new version of the work or has other-
wise rearranged or transformed it so as to have made an original contri-
bution."'" The court concluded that the plaintiff had not utilized
preexisting design elements in a sufficiently original manner to warrant
copyright protection, but "merely had placed a number of common
glassware cuttings on its bottle in an apparently common configuration
16. Id. at 1207.
17. Id. at 1207-08.
18. 612 F. Supp. 986 (C.D.N.Y. 1985).
19. Id. at 991 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir.
1976); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980)).
20. Id. at 991-92.
21. Id. at 992.
1990]
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without significant changes or additions. ' 22 The Towle court made an
important distinction concerning minimal originality by stating that bor-
rowed elements will not defeat copyrightability as long as the author has
devised a new version of the work or has rearranged it in an original
manner.
The Towle court, although denying the copyright, seemed to employ
a more lenient originality test in deciding what constituted an original
work by stating that a mere rearrangement and transformation may be
enough to obtain copyright protection, as long as an original contribution
is made. If the Towle rearrangement test were applied to the Atari facts,
it is possible that the Atari court would have granted copyright protec-
tion for the ball and paddle game by finding that the requisite minimal
amount of artistic originality existed.
A sweater design became the focal point of the originality inquiry in
In Design v. Lynch Knitting Mills, Inc. 23 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant infringed its copyright in a sweater design, an argyle pattern
connected by smaller black diamonds. The defendant responded that the
sweater design was not copyrightable due to its lack of originality. The
court began its analysis by stating that the originality test for copyright
purposes has a very low threshold.24 The court concluded that the de-
fendants had failed to prove a lack of originality on the plaintiff's part:
The meager evidence introduced by defendants to show that the "Ap-
erture" design was not the product of some independent creation con-
sisted only of the contention of their expert witness that it [was] a mere
variation of a standard argyle pattern. The only actual examples of
argyle patterns placed in evidence in this case were introduced by [the
plaintiff], and the "Aperture" pattern is clearly not a copy of any of
them.25
Thus, Lynch appears to impart an even lower threshold of original-
ity than either Atari or Towle. The case suggests that the reason the
sweater design was deemed original enough for copyright protection was
due merely to the fact that the defendant failed to prove that it was not
the product of independent creation. The court seems to be saying that
as long as the design is clearly not a copy of another design, the original-
ity requirement will be satisfied.
A work with an even lower level of originality than the sweater de-
sign in Lynch was granted copyright protection in Haan Crafts Corp. v.
22. Id.
23. 689 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
24. Id. at 178.
25. Id. at 179. Lynch also demonstrates that when a copyrighted item is challenged on
the basis of originality, the burden of proof is clearly on the challenging party to present ade-
quate evidence demonstrating lack of originality.
(Vol. 12:303
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Craft Masters, Inc. 26 The plaintiff designed, manufactured and sold sew-
ing kits to junior and senior high schools for home economics classes.
Most of the sewing kits contained patterns used to make stuffed animals,
stuffed balls, sweat outfits, jackets and athletic bags. The plaintiff sued a
former employee for copyright infringement on the designs.27
Initially, the court noted that there was no question the plaintiffs
themselves copied extensively: "Ideas for many kits come initially from
scrutinizing patterns already on the market or by taking apart various
store-bought items and figuring out how they are made."28 However, the
court stated that "the work need not be novel, but must embody some
modest amount of intellectual labor."29 Lacking substantial evidence to
the contrary, the court concluded that there was some likelihood that the
plaintiff could show originality under the Seventh Circuit minimal origi-
nality criteria. Consequently, the copyright was found valid.3"
Thus, unlike Lynch, Atari, and Towle, Haan almost completely
eliminated any threshold originality requirement. The Haan court con-
cluded that the plaintiff copied extensively from other items on the mar-
ket, but found the practice was acceptable so long as a "modest amount
of intellectual labor" was involved. For the purpose of defining art based
on a modicum of originality, the Haan test is the epitome of minimalism.
A different approach was used to test originality in Gund, Inc. v.
Smile Int'l, Inc.31 The plaintiff brought an action claiming that the de-
fendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in a stuffed toy dog called
"Muttsy." Muttsy was designed without rigid parts and, therefore,
"flopped" on the floor and rested with its nose touching the ground. The
defendant's product was similar, but did have some different qualities.32
The court denied the plaintiff copyright protection, stating that "the law
will not grant an author a monopoly over the unparticularized expression
of an idea at such a level of abstraction or generality as to unduly inhibit
independent creation by others."'3 3 The court went on to say that
although there were similarities between the two stuffed animals, the
"features that might cause an ordinary observer to regard the aesthetic
26. 683 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
27. Id. at 1237-38. These kits also contained pre-selected materials to be used in creating
the finished articles.
28. Id. at 1238.
29. Id. at 1243.
30. Id.
31. 691 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
32. Id. at 643.
33. Id. at 644.
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appeal as similar, if not quite the same, are the very features so genera-
lized as not to be the subject of copyright protection."34
Gund uses an "ordinary observer" test to determine originality.
This test concludes that if an ordinary observer would view the aesthetic
appeal of the works as being substantially similar, then the originality
requirement has not been met. Defining art in terms of what an ordinary
observer would deem "original" is in sharp contrast to the Haan and
Lynch tests. Those cases concentrated on the amount of originality pres-
ent in the creation as determined by the extent of copying from another
work. Gund presents a new test involving the ordinary observer and, by
doing so, adds a new criterion to the legal definition of art for copyright
purposes.
This ordinary observer test was implicitly applied in Cory Van Rijn
v. California Raisin Advisory Bd.35 The plaintiffs argued that the defend-
ants' use of "claymatic raisin" characters in their advertising constituted
copyright and trademark infringement of their "raisin people." The de-
fendants, on the other hand, claimed that a humanized raisin figure is
nothing more than a common idea, incapable of copyright protection,
and that the plaintiff was attempting to copyright features which were
necessarily common to all humanized raisin characters. The district
court stated that the idea and the expression will coincide when the ex-
pression provides nothing new or additional to the overall idea: "This is
not a case where the idea is indistinguishable as a matter of law from the
expression of that idea .... The characters each have developed person-
alities and particular ways of interacting with one another and their envi-
ronment. The physical setting also has several unique features."3 6 The
court concluded that the plaintiff was attempting to claim copyright pro-
tection for the idea of a "humanized raisin" and that idea was too gen-
eral: "[T]he two works do not in any way look alike beyond the raisin
bodies, ... the images projected are completely different" and the idea is
too general to warrant copyright protection.37
It was important to the California Raisin court that, while both
plaintiff and defendant used similar raisin characters, the defendant's rai-
sin character contained several unique physical features and thus satisfied
the originality requirement of the Copyright Act. Consequently, the Cal-
ifornia Raisin court, by implication, applied the same test that Gund ex-
plicitly applied.
34. Id. at 645.
35. 697 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
36. Id. at 1140.
37. Id. at 1145.
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The legal definition of art for copyright analysis therefore requires
that the work in question have at least a modicum of originality. As
discussed above, the courts have interpreted the originality requirement
as having a very low threshold, asking the following questions when test-
ing originality:
1. Is the work a common design? (Atari)
2. Is the design commonly used in the trade? If so, has the design
been rearranged in a manner that exhibits a minimal amount of origi-
nality? (Towle)
3. Was the work copied? (Lynch) If so, is there a minimal amount of
intellectual labor involved? (Haan)
4. Would an ordinary observer viewing the two objects conclude that
the two items are substantially similar? (California Raisin) If so, is the
substantially similar feature one that is so generalized as to be deemed
an unoriginal expression and, therefore, non-copyrightable? (Gund)
Various courts emphasize different elements of the originality test.
Case law addressing originality in the legal definition of art for the pur-
poses of copyright protection demonstrates that courts have generally de-
fined originality at a very low threshold. The next section will address
how the courts purport to apply a higher standard of originality to deriv-
ative works. This higher standard molds the legal definition of art into a
slightly different form, but a form which is very similar to the low thresh-
old for non-derivative works.
2. Derivative Works
Unlike the minimal originality test for non-derivative works, most
courts have held that if a copyright is sought for a derivative work (i.e.,
a work based on an earlier work),38 a substantial amount of originality is
required.39 In Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,4 the plaintiffs
claimed to hold a copyright on three wind-up plastic figures, recogniza-
ble as the Disney characters Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Pluto.
The court pointed out that neither party had contested the fact that
Walt Disney created the three characters. The plaintiff also acknow-
ledged Disney's ownership of the copyrights on the characters, and con-
ceded that without a license from Disney, the plaintiff's publication of
the characters would constitute infringement.4' Furthermore, the court
stated that "derivative works are explicitly included in the subject matter
of copyright as defined by the Copyright Act [but,] to support a copy-
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
39. Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11 th Cir. 1985).
40. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 909.
19901
right the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than
trivial."42
The copyright originality requirement, the court stated, cannot be
satisfied by merely reproducing a work of art in a different medium, nor
by the demonstration of some physical, as opposed to artistic, skill.43
Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiff's characters were
exact duplicates of the Disney characters and were not copyrightable:
[O]ur concern is with carrying out the statutory command that protec-
tion of a derivative work not affect the scope of copyright protection in
an underlying work. If we were to recognize Tomy's derivative copy-
rights in its figures, those who, like Durham, have obtained from Dis-
ney the right to copy Disney's own characters would, as a practical
matter, have to make substantial changes in those characters in order
to avoid infringing Tomy's rights. 44
Thus, the Durham court forcefully stated the public policy rationale
behind requiring more than a minimal amount of artistic creativity in
order to grant copyright protection to a derivative work. It may be diffi-
cult, however, as a practical matter, to distinguish between a physical
skill and an artistic creation. The Durham court implied that if the skill
is merely a manufacturing skill, this would not be enough. The line
drawn between manufacturing skill and artistic creation is a difficult one
to discern.
Although the Durham court purports to apply the higher standard
of "substantial originality" for derivative works, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that this test is very similar to the originality test used for
non-derivative works. By requiring the work to be an artistic creation, as
opposed to a mere manufacturing skill, isn't the court merely restating
the test for minimal originality? Durham seems to be stating, in effect,
that as long as some form of artistic originality is demonstrated, a copy-
right may be granted. This sounds similar to the test enunciated in cases
such as Lynch, where an extremely low threshold of originality was the
rule.
The similarity between the definitions for derivative and non-deriva-
tive works was demonstrated in Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida,
Inc. 45 The suit involved a silk-screened beach towel with an ocean beach
scene. The scene was an original design that was not copyrighted. One
of the plaintiff's artists later redesigned the towel by making several di-
mensional changes in the various elements of the beach scene. Subse-
quently, when the defendant's towel appeared on the market, and was
42. Id.
43. Id. at 910.
44. Id. at 910-11.
45. 753 F.2d 1565 (l1th Cir. 1985).
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substantially similar to the plaintiff's towel, the plaintiff sued for copy-
right infringement.
The court stated that it was "well settled that in order to qualify for
a separate copyright, a derivative work must contain a substantial degree
of originality."46 "[T]he one indispensable element of authorship," the
court opined, is "originality [and one] who has slavishly or mechanically
copied from others may not claim authorship."47 The court denied copy-
right protection to the plaintiff, stating that a side-by-side comparison of
the works in question showed that the contributions made by the plain-
tiff's artist were simply too trivial and too insubstantial to justify copy-
right protection: "Our conclusion ... is influenced by the obvious fact
that the majority of those distinguishing details are so minor that they
are virtually unnoticeable upon a cursory comparison of the two
towels." 48
Again, as in Durham, the Sherry court purportedly applied a higher
standard of originality for derivative works than for non-derivative
works. The court, however, used a test for originality which consisted of
placing the two designs side-by-side and asking whether an ordinary ob-
server would notice a difference between the works. This sounds exactly
like the "ordinary observer" test used in Gund and California Raisin.
The similarity of these two tests casts suspicion on the distinction the
court attempts to make between derivative and non-derivative works.
Consequently, for purposes of the legal definition of art, the original-
ity tests which courts apply to both derivative and non-derivative works
in order to determine whether or not to grant copyright protection ap-
pear to require a very low level of originality.49
C. The Separability Requirement
The separability requirement becomes important in deciding
whether a work is an industrial design or whether it is applied art. The
copyright statute makes the distinction between works of applied art,
46. Id. at 1568.
47. Id. (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A], at 1-37 (1984)).
48. Id.
49. For other recent cases discussing derivative works, see Past Pluto Prod. Corp. v.
Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); E. Mishan & Sons v. Marycana, 662 F. Supp. 1339
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
The other interesting point about Sherry is that the court tested the validity of the copy-
right by stating that a cursory comparison of the two towels showed no substantial originality
involved in the second design. Exactly what this "cursory comparison" means in legal terms
was not made clear. Is this cursory comparison to be an objective test whereby the reasonably
prudent person would notice no difference? Is this reasonably prudent person standing in the
shoes of a consumer, a judge, a copyright expert, an artist, or who? The court never makes this
clear; consequently, its analysis is rather murky.
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which are eligible for copyright protection and works of industrial de-
sign, which may be patented but may not be copyrighted. 0 The present
test finds that a useful article's design will be "considered a pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work [and, therefore, copyrightable] if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.""
Traditionally, this separability requirement has discriminated
against "modern" designs such as the light fixture in Esquire v. Ringer.52
In that case, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to register a copyright
for a geometrically designed parking lot light. Recent case law in New
York and California, however, has substantially broadened the concept
of separability, allowing the inclusion of objects such as the Esquire light
if the intent of the artist was to create a work of applied art. The cases,
therefore, have centered on defining art for copyright purposes based on
the nature and use of the work.53
1. The Usefulness Test
If the design which is sought to be copyrighted is not part of a useful
object, then the "applied art" test does not arise. It therefore becomes
important to discern whether or not the design is, in fact, part of a useful
object.
The generally accepted definition of a "useful object," for purposes
of the Copyright Act, was articulated in Trans- World Mfg. Corp. v. Al
Nyman & Sons, Inc.54 The plaintiff copyrighted the design of an eyeglass
display case. The defendant argued that the eyeglass case was an indus-
trial design and, therefore, was uncopyrightable. The case was a box-like
structure containing a curving, free-form sculpture which created a scal-
loped effect-an aesthetically pleasing feature.
The court began by stating that the display case had been copy-
righted as a sculptural work under section 102(a)(5) of the Copyright
Act.55 The court went on to define "useful article:". "a 'useful article' is
an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An arti-
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (citing Historical and Revision Notes, H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong.).
51. Id.
52. 591 F.2d. 796 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917
(1979).
53. NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 202-03.
54. 95 F.R.D. 95 (D.C. Del. 1982).
55. Id. at 96.
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cle that is normally part of a useful article is considered a 'useful
article.' "56
It was clear to the court that the eyeglass case constituted a useful
object and, therefore, the issue of separability needed to be addressed.
The Nyman court pointed out that, in deciding whether or not the artis-
tic design is separable from the utilitarian aspect of the article, a contro-
versy arises as to whether mere conceptual separability is sufficient, or if
actual physical separability is required:
The Second Circuit has held, contrary to Esquire, that "conceptual
separability" of a useful article's sculptural and utilitarian features is
sufficient to sustain copyright registrability .... The Second Circuit
rejected the assertion that the conceptual separability of a sculptural
element from a useful article was inadequate to support copyright
[stating that] "this assertion flies in the face of legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the House Report, which specifically refers to elements that
'physically or conceptually can be identified as separable from the utili-
tarian aspects of' a useful article." "[A] useful article that is "concep-
tually, though not physically, separable from its utilitarian elements is
copyrightable." 57
Thus, the Nyman opinion made two important points concerning the
legal definition of art:
1. If an article has an intrinsic utilitarian function that does more
than merely portray the article or convey information, it will be classi-
fied as a useful article.
2. If the article is utilitarian, the artistic expression must be concep-
tually separate from its utilitarian aspects in order to obtain copyright
protection.
The importance of this two-part analysis is that it strictly limits
what will be classified as art for copyright purposes when a utilitarian
object is being scrutinized by the courts. If the court can find no concep-
tually separable elements, it will deny copyright protection on the
grounds that what it is viewing is not applied art but rather, industrial
design.
Most courts have followed this conceptual separability analysis and
do not require physical separability. A good example of a court inter-
preting the useful article requirement is illustrated in Poe v. Missing Per-
sons.5" The defendant filed a claim seeking damages for the copying of an
article he created, which he described as art work in the soft sculpture
medium entitled Aquatint #5. The work was a rendering of an article of
clothing. The artist developed and originated this piece as a work of art
to stand by itself. When the defendant used the article of clothing in a
56. Id. at 97 n.4 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
57. Id. at 98-99 (citing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993
(2d Cir. 1980)).
58. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
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photograph, the plaintiff sued. The defendant claimed that the article
was not copyrightable because it was a purely functional piece of
clothing.
The Ninth Circuit found that the defendant presented no evidence
to support the trial court's finding that the article could be used as an
actual piece of clothing.5 9 The court stated that the plaintiff was at-
tempting to create nothing more than a work of art and therefore, the
piece was merely the portrayal of an article of clothing, and not an actual
article of clothing.60
In its decision, the court laid out four bases on which a trier of fact
should rely in deciding the question of usefulness:
1. Expert evidence concerning the usefulness of the article, and
whether any apparently functional aspects could be separated from the
artistic aspects.
2. Evidence of the plaintiff's intent in designing the article is relevant
in determining whether or not it has a utilitarian function.
3. Testimony concerning custom and usage within the art world and
the clothing trade is relevant where objects such as this are at issue.
4. The admissibility of evidence concerning the article's marketabil-
ity as work of art. 6 1
The Poe court foreshadowed the later "intent of the creator" test
used in discussing the separability requirement by applying that test to
the usefulness requirement. Although a test which looks to the creator's
intent is initially attractive, especially in relation to the separability re-
quirement, it can be difficult to apply, absent a substantial amount of
independent evidence.
The "marketability" test used in Poe also has its problems. It ap-
pears to discriminate against lesser-known artists whose works are not
well established and, thus, are not as marketable as the works of better-
known artists. Undoubtedly, this result was not contemplated by the
Copyright Act. Therefore, trade custom and usage may be a more equi-
table sign-post for the usefulness requirement. It allows the court to de-
termine what is and is not art based on the artistic communities' own
judgment.
59. Id. at 1241.
60. Id. at 1242.
61. Id. at 1243. It should be noted that articles such as toys are never classified as useful
articles. See Gay Toys, Inc.v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff
sued the defendant for copying the plaintiff's designs for various toy airplanes. In a short
opinion, the Sixth Circuit flatly denied that toys in general were useful articles:
But the statutory definition of "useful article" suggests that toys are copyrightable.
To be a "useful article" the item must have an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article. . . . The function of toys is much
more similar to that of works of art than it is to the "intrinsic utilitarian function" of
industrial products.
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As Nyman and Poe demonstrate, the question of utility becomes
crucial where the defendant in a copyright infringement suit asserts that
the copyright is invalid because it is for a strictly utilitarian article. This
utilitarian issue can result in the court focusing on a definition of art
which may deny copyright protection to an article which meets the origi-
nality requirement discussed earlier, but is purely a utilitarian article
with no artistic attributes.
2. Separability Test
Once the court has established that it is considering a utilitarian ob-
ject, the court will not automatically deny copyright protection if the
party seeking protection can demonstrate that the artistic expression is
conceptually separable from the utilitarian nature of the object. The legal
definition of art has been expanded to include artistic expressions which
are part of a utilitarian object provided that the expression is separable.
One of the first battle lines drawn regarding this issue was over the ques-
tion of which type of separability, physical or conceptual, was to be the
applicable yardstick.
This issue was specifically addressed in Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l
Tel. & Tel. Corp.,6 2 where the plaintiff created a design for automobile
wheel covers that simulated a wire wheel, and applied to the Copyright
Office for registration. The Copyright Office rejected the design as non-
copyrightable. Later, the plaintiff instituted a suit against ITT alleging
copyright and patent infringement. In response, ITT filed a suit against
the plaintiff for a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of the
copyright and patents. ITT's main argument regarding the copyright is-
sue was that the wire wheel design was purely a part of the utilitarian
function of the wheel cover.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with ITT, stating that the "wheel cov-
ers [were] utilitarian articles serving as hubcaps to protect the lug-nuts,
brakes, wheels, and axles."' 63 The court addressed the separation require-
ment, stating that:
[T]he record indicates that Norris sought copyright registration for the
entire wheel cover. Even if the arrangement of spokes could be identi-
fied separately, however, they are incapable of existing indepen-
dently .... "Physical separability would presumably mean that after
removal of those features which are necessary for the utilitarian func-
tions of the article, the artistic features would nevertheless remain
intact."' 64
62. 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 922.
64. Id. at 923 (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3], at 2-96
(1984)).
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The plaintiff logically argued that conceptual separability, rather
than physical separability, was the relevant test. The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that this case was different from a situa-
tion where the conceptual elements are purely ornamental, superfluous
designs contained within a useful object. The court concluded that func-
tional components of useful articles, no matter how artistically designed
they may be, have generally been denied copyright protection unless they
are physically separable from the useful article.65
The court went on to state that if the design is the subject of tradi-
tional copyright protection, such as the jewelry in Kieselstein-Cord, then
it would be copyrightable.66 In that case, the plaintiff sought to copy-
right an abstract-shaped belt buckle.
The logical conclusion to be drawn from Norris is that if the spokes
on the wheel had served no functional purpose whatsoever, but had been
merely put there as an ornamental design, they would have been copy-
rightable as being conceptually separate. This appears to be a somewhat
dubious distinction in light of the fact that most wheel cover designs
seem to do more than function simply as utilitarian reinforcers of wheel
covers. The court's idea that traditional copyright protection should be
looked to when making these decisions also seems odd. The point of the
separability requirement is not to simply look to prior copyright law,
especially when dealing with an area as dynamic as artistic creation. One
cannot help but conclude that the Norris analysis leaves much to be
desired.67
The Eleventh Circuit's physical separability test seems to have been
rejected by most courts as being too restrictive. In view of recent Second
65. Id. at 923-24.
66. Id. at 924 (citing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980)).
67. See also Act Young Imports, Inc. v. B & E Sales Co., 667 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), in which the plaintiff claimed that after being shown samples of copyrighted animal-
shaped children's backpacks in plaintiff's showroom, the defendant went to Asia and had cop-
ies of the plaintiff's product made by the same manufacturer. The defendant claimed that the
backpacks were not copyrightable. The court quickly disposed of the defendant's arguments,
stating that "[e]xamination of the backpacks yields the conclusion.., that the artistic aspect of
the backpack, that is the animal image, is separate from the useful function of the packs.
Therefore, the backpacks are copyrightable." Id. at 87.
In Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the plaintiff
sued for alleged infringement of its banana leaf lamp design. The design was based on an
artist's rendering of a banana leaf plant which she saw from the window of her sister's house.
The leaves in the design were somewhat elongated versions of natural banana leaves , inter-
twined in a fashion not found in nature. The court found that the design was clearly concep-
tually separable from the utilitarian object on which it had appeared. Id. at 1151. This
decision is important because the court rejected the defendant's argument that the design was a
mere imitation of nature and, therefore, not copyrightable. The court stated that the leaves of
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and Ninth Circuit decisions, the legal definition of art for copyright pur-
poses in the area of utilitarian objects has taken on a broader scope.
In Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. ,"8 the plaintiff
designed a bicycle rack called the Ribbon Rack. It originated from a
wire sculpture and was made of bent tubing. The issue in the case re-
volved around the conceptual separability of such a utilitarian item from
the artistic aspects of the design. The Second Circuit began by reiterat-
ing that conceptual separability was alive and well in the Second Circuit
but stated further that the problem was in determining what conceptual
separability is and how it is to be applied.69
The court considered a law review article by Professor Denicola,
stating that:
Denicola argues that the "statutory directive requires a distinction be-
tween works of industrial design and works whose origins lie outside
the design process, despite the utilitarian environment in which they
appear." He views the statutory limitation of copyrightability as "an
attempt to identify elements whose form and appearance reflect the
unconstrained perspective of the artist," such features not being the
product of industrial design. (citation omitted) "Copyrightability,
therefore, should turn on the relationship between the proffered work
and the process of industrial design." (citation omitted) He suggests
that "the dominant characteristic of industrial design is the influence
of non-aesthetic utilitarian concerns" and hence concludes that
copyrightability "ultimately should depend on the extent to which the
work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by function considera-
tions." (footnote and citiations omitted) To state the Denicola test in
the language of conceptual separability, if design elements reflect the
merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects
of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilita-
rian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of
functional influences, conceptual separability exists.7 °
The Brandir court embraced Denicola's analysis, stating that his empha-
sis on the influence of utilitarian concerns in the design process may help
to alleviate the de facto discrimination against non-representational art
that has regrettably accompanied much of the current analysis. 7'
the banana plant were longer than natural leaves, their veins and notches were stylized rather
than copied from nature and they twisted and intertwined in a way not found in nature. Id.
This "imitation of nature" test appears to be an offshoot of the originality test. If the
artist has merely copied from nature, apparently this is not original enough to obtain a copy-
right. However, if the design is not merely a copy but demonstrates some originality on the
part of the artist, it will be considered copyrightable. Thus, in a situation where a copyright is
sought for a design on a useful article, the design must be both original and conceptually
separable.
68. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1144.
70. Id. at 1145.
71. Id.
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The court applied Denicola's test to the Ribbon Rack and found
that the rack was not copyrightable. The court concluded that the form
of the rack was significantly influenced by utilitarian concerns, on the
basis of evidence that utilitarian alterations were made in the design.
The court further noted that had the plaintiff merely used one 'of the
existing sculptures as a bicycle rack, neither the application to a utilita-
rian end, nor commercialization of that use, would have caused the ob-
ject to forfeit its copyright protection. In creating the rack, however, the
designer clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate
and further a utilitarian purpose.72 Thus, any aesthetic elements could
not be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.73
The Brandir court articulated a new approach to testing conceptual
separability, an approach quite different from the one taken in Esquire v.
Ringer.7 1 In both the Second and Ninth Circuits, the intent of the de-
signer becomes an all-important aspect of the analysis. Consequently,
the distinction emphasized in Esquire between the functional design and
the aesthetic nature of the object becomes less important. This new anal-
ysis eliminates the Esquire bias against modern design, which contains
little or no decorative quality separate from its function. In this respect,
the Brandir approach clearly expands the legal definition of art for copy-
right purposes.
In National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc.,75 the
Ninth Circuit substantially agreed with the analysis set forth in Brandir.
In Beck, the plaintiff attempted to enforce a copyright on masquerade
costumes which the defendant alleged were not copyrightable because
they were purely utilitarian. The court stated that costumes have an in-
trinsically utilitarian function and, thus, cannot be copyrighted as cos-
tumes.76 However, the court ruled that the features need only be
conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of the garment in
order to gain protection under the Copyright Act.77 Agreeing with the
Brandir analysis, the court stated that:
[It] concur[red] with the Second Circuit's adoption of the Denicola test
to the extent it requires one to look to an artist's or designer's creative
process, and the decisions going into that process, in creating a useful
article. To the extent that the decision in Brandir relies upon the se-
quences of actions or decisions made in putting together an article, the
Court believes the Second Circuit improperly applied the Denicola
72. Id. at 1148.
73. Id. at 1147.
74. Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, reh'g
denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).
75. 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
76. Id. at 1352.
77. Id.
[Vol. 12:303
LEGAL DEFINITION OF ART
test. As this Court reads the Denicola article, sequentially and chrono-
logically dependent results go beyond Denicola's intent and will cause
decisions to turn upon largely fortuitous circumstances occurring dur-
ing the creative process.
7V
The court held that the costume designs were copyrightable since they
were the result of the artist's arbitrary conceptions.7 9
A close reading of Beck reveals that it grants broader copyright pro-
tection than that granted by the Brandir test. Beck discards the idea
articulated in Brandir that altering an artist's work subsequent to its cre-
ation can destroy the work's copyright protection. Beck implies that this
sort of analysis is inconsistent with the Denicola thesis. However, the
Beck court does not go on to explain why it is inconsistent, but merely
restates the Denicola test and adopts its own interpretation of that test.
In any event, Beck seems to imply that the litmus test for separability, at
least in the Southern District of California, revolves around the de-
signer's intent and whether that intent was to create an industrial design
or an artistic design.
Legally defining art for copyright purposes thus becomes a two-step
analysis:
1. If the work is completely non-useful, such as a toy, it is clearly
copyrightable if a minimal amount of originality is demonstrated. If
the work is derivative, the courts purport to apply a test which requires
a substantial amount of originality. Case law reveals, however, that
this test is really not very different from the basic minimal originality
test.
2. If the work is a useful article, then the court must determine
whether it is a work of applied art or industrial design. At this point,
the court will determine whether or not the design is conceptually sep-
arable from the useful article.
D. Copyright Summary
The legal definition of art in the copyright field appears to have
grown broader in recent years. Cases such as Atari, which consider
whether or not the expression is a common design, have been tempered
by such decisions as Towle and Lynch. These later cases seem to stand
for the proposition that a design will be accorded copyright protection as
long as there is some sort of originality displayed, even if that originality
is merely rearranging a common design in a creative fashion. The Haan
court's discussion of a "modest amount of intellectual labor" also points
to a low threshold requirement for courts to consider what constitutes art
for copyright purposes.
78. Id. at 1353.
79. Id.
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When courts are faced with a useful object, the legal definition of art
becomes a bit more restricted; minimal originality is not the only test.
The creator must also demonstrate that the artistic expression is separa-
ble from the utilitarian object. This requirement narrows the legal defini-
tion of art by putting an additional burden on the creator not only to
demonstrate originality, but to show that a work of applied art and not
industrial design has been created.
As Brandir and Beck suggest, the legal definition of art as applied to
artistic expressions in utilitarian objects has been broadened considerably
since Esquire v. Ringer. In Esquire, the court looked only to the end
product to determine separability. Whereas, both the Brandir and Beck
courts embraced, to some extent, the Denicola analysis which looks to
the intent of the creator to determine separability.
At first glance, the Denicola test appears to be too subjective, al-
lowing creators to manufacture artistic intent where none really exists.
The Brandir court, however, not only looked to the creator's subjective
intent, but also to the creator's actions. In determining that Brandir
made a physical utilitarian-based change in the bike rack's design, the
court exposed his non-artistic intent. This appears to be a useful ap-
proach. It allows the court to determine the true intent of the creator
while avoiding the pitfalls of Esquire, which resulted in the discrimina-
tion against modern "truth of function" objects. Thus, if courts follow
the approach articulated in Brandir, the legal definition of art for copy-
right purposes will be substantially expanded.
II
The Customs Definition
A. Introduction
The legal definition of art in customs law is crucial since certain
items, if classified as works of art, enter the United States duty-free. The
author will illustrate later how the new Harmonized Tariff System' °
changes the legal definition of art, making it much easier for importers to
identify objects that may enter the United States as duty-free art.
The customs courts have been grappling with the definition of art
for customs regulation purposes for decades. Much of the customs defi-
nition has stemmed from the classification of particular goods under
tariff schedules. The tariff rates levied on specific goods were originally
80. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, HARMONIZED TARIFF
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, USITC Pub. 2232 (1990) [hereinafter HARMONIZED
TARIFF SCHEDULE]. See also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, §§ 1201-17, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-12 (1988)).
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intended, in part,"' to equalize the difference between the cost of produc-
ing the item in a foreign country and its introduction into the United
States marketplace, and the cost of producing and selling like or similar
articles in the United States.82
Tariff laws, to protect domestic producers, are only appropriate
when foreign goods compete directly with domestic items. If a foreign
produced item is unique and no domestically produced substitute exists,
then there appears to be no justification for taxing the article upon its
importation. The imposition of a tariff upon a unique foreign good has
the effect of increasing the price to domestic consumers for an otherwise
unavailable article.8 3
Consequently, when determining whether an item is to be given
duty-free status as a work of art, customs law looks to see whether the
imported piece will directly compete with American-made goods. Theo-
retically, works of art are unique to their creator and when they are not
interchangeable with American-made goods, they are generally accorded
duty-free status.
One prong of the modern definition of art for customs purposes was
articulated in Brancusi v. United States. 84 In Brancusi, the importer at-
tempted to import an artist's impressionistic bronze sculptures of a bird
in flight. The court examined the workmanship of the piece and the rep-
utation of its creator, and concluded that the object was indeed a work of
art, despite the fact that the court felt it did not resemble a bird.85 The
Brancusi decision, therefore, expanded the Customs definition of art to
include "modem" art.
More than 30 years after Brancusi, a more liberal definition of art
received legislative recognition when the 1959 Customs Law Amend-
ments resolved some of the problems that had surfaced in the case law.
The language "in any other media" was added to the definition of fine art
in order to expand its scope to include collages, lithographs, prints and
original mosaics, as well as other forms of modem art.86
B. The Tariff Schedules of the United States and the Harmonized System
The modern approach to classifying works of art for customs pur-
poses is to levy the applicable rate of duty established in a tariff schedule.
81. Customs duties were also imposed for the purpose of generating revenue. See DuBoff,
Changing Art Customs: Removing the Tariff Barriers, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45 (1985).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 48.
84. 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928).
85. Id. at 430-31.
86. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-262, 73 Stat. 549 (1959).
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Prior to 1989, the Tariff Schedules of the United States ("TSUS") were
used to determine the proper duty rate. These schedules consisted of lists
of product categories identified by item number and accompanied by a
description and corresponding duty fee. When a product was imported
into the United States, it was matched to the appropriate category on the
tariff schedule and assessed the corresponding duty. 7
In 1989 the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Sys-
tem (the "Harmonized System") was implemented, and the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule replaced the TSUS. ss The Harmonized System was de-
veloped over a ten-year period by the Customs Cooperation Council. 9
The Harmonized System was designed to serve internationally "as a stan-
dard system of classifying goods for customs, statistical, and transport
documentation purposes." 90
The Harmonized System imposes a single task upon those who im-
port into nations which have implemented the system. To determine the
customs duty on an item in any of those nations, the importer need only
identify the appropriate classification number of the item in question.
That number will be the same in all countries utilizing the Harmonized
System. Prior to the adoption of this system, an importer had to deter-
mine the appropriate commodity description and corresponding classifi-
cation number for each individual nation to which the particular item
was to be sent.
The Harmonized System went into effect on January 1, 1989, and
consequently there is not yet any case law interpreting the new system.
The Harmonized System has redefined the legal definition of art for cus-
toms purposes. 9 '
1. Sculpture
In the area of sculpture, the TSUS appears to have been substan-
tially altered by the Harmonized System, which eliminates the require-
ment that the work be produced by a professional sculptor.
87. Olsen, Tariff Classification: Classifying Works of Art For Purposes of Customs Duty,
26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631 (1981).
88. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80.
89. R. STURM, 2 CUSTOMs LAW & ADMINISTRATION § 50.4 (3d ed. 1988). The Customs
Cooperation Council (CCC), an international and intergovernmental organization, has 98
member countries including the European Community, the U.S., most of the eastern European
countries, and China. The purpose of the CCC is to simplify and harmonize customs proce-
dures of its various member states.
90. R. STURM, supra note 89, § 50.4.
91. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80, at hdgs. 9701-9706.00.00. Com-
pare UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED
STATES ANN., sched. 7, pt. 11, USITC Pub. 1910 (1987) [hereinafter TSUS ANN.].
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Heading 9703 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule confers duty-free
status on "original sculptures and statuary, in any material." Item
765.15 of the TSUS provided for duty-free importation of "original
sculptures and statuary ... made in any form from any material as pro-
fessional productions of sculptors only." 92 This TSUS requirement had
been interpreted to mean that in order to qualify as a duty-free work of
art under the "professional productions" standard, a sculpture must have
been created by an artist who was "a graduate of a course in sculpture at
a recognized school of art (fine art, not industrial art) .... or [was] recog-
nized in art circles as a professional sculptor by the acceptance of his
works in public exhibitions limited to the fine arts."9 3 The purpose of the
professional productions standard, and the test used to apply that stan-
dard, was to enable U.S. Customs officials to distinguish between works
of bona fide artists and the works of so-called artisans.94
The application of this rule is illustrated in Mayers, Osterwald and
Muhifeld, Inc. v. E.F Bendler,95 where the court concluded that a cut
diamond was the product of an artisan rather than an artist, because
there was no mental concept resulting in an aesthetic expression of the
cutter in the cutting of the stone. Another example of the rule's applica-
tion is United States v. Oberlaender9 6 in which the court found that
hand-painted porcelain plates were works of artisans, since the plates
could have been made according to explicit instructions from the
purchaser.
The discriminating effect of this rule was clear. The professional
productions standard did much more than "exclude objects crafted by
non-artists; it also excluded works of primitive sculptors. Primitive
sculptors usually acquire their artistic skills as apprentices rather than at
art schools, and live where there are few museums or art galleries
through which they may become 'established.' "9'
Under the new Harmonized System, the professional sculptor re-
quirement has been eliminated: "This heading covers original sculptures
and statuary, ancient or modern. They may be in any material ... in the
round, in relief or in intaglio."98 There is absolutely no requirement in
the body, the headnotes or the annotations to heading 9703 of the Har-
monized Tariff Schedule that the producer of the sculpture be a profes-
sional. This puts sculpture on an equal footing with paintings, drawings
92. TSUS ANN., supra note 91, at item 765.15.
93. C.I.E. 160/56, at 2 (1956).
94. Id.
95. 18 C.C.P.A. 117 (1930).
96. 25 C.C.P.A. 24 (1937).
97. DuBoff, supra note 81, at 58.
98. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80, at hdg. 9703.00.00.
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and other forms of art where a professional production requirement has
never been imposed.99 This could lead to duty-free status being granted
more broadly to sculptural pieces previously denied entry on the grounds
that they were not professionally produced works of art.
2. Utility and Industrial Use Exclusions
Another area of customs law where the New Harmonized System
has greatly liberalized the definition of art is in the area of utilitarian
objects and objects of industrial use. Under the TSUS, articles of utility
or industrial use were excluded from duty-free status as works of art."o
This classification created problems in situations such as the one
involved in T.D. Downing Co. v. United States. °1 In Downing, the plain-
tiff imported six carved door panels which originally had been removed
from a pair of doors in a Vermont church. The panels were shipped to a
sculptor in England to be carved, after which they were to be returned to
the church and reinstalled in the doors. The court found that since doors
were ordinarily articles of utility, and because the panels in question were
an integral part of the church doors, without which they would not be
able to function properly, the panels were utilitarian and, therefore, ex-
cluded from the class of art accorded free entry under the tariff
schedules. 1o2
The distinction between functional fine art and non-functional fine
art is unfortunate. The result of such a distinction is best illustrated by
the fact that door panels, otherwise skillfully created works of bas relief
sculpture by a recognized artist, were denied free entry merely because
they served a functional purpose. Such a result does nothing to enhance
the protection of domestic producers from foreign competition. The use-
fulness of a work of art is irrelevant to its competitive effect. The expense
and effort the church builders underwent to send the panels to England
demonstrates that they did not simply desire carved door panels, but
rather it illustrated their desire to have the panels carved by a particular
artist. Taxing the panels upon their return to the United States "only
nominally increased the government's revenues by the amount of tariff
imposed, and did not protect American industry."' '
99. Interview with Harvey Steele, Supervising Import Specialist for U.S. Customs (Apr.
20, 1989). Mr. Steele confirmed this conclusion, stating that, for all practical purposes, cus-
toms officials consider the professional sculptor requirement to be eliminated by the new Har-
monized System.
100. TSUS ANN., supra note 91, at subpt. A, headnote (1)(iv).
101. 321 F. Supp. 1036 (Cust. Ct. 1971).
102. Id. at 1040.
103. DuBoff, supra note 81, at 63.
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The exclusion of the panels from receiving duty-free status did little
to serve the purposes of the customs laws in protecting U.S. industry. It
is likely that the owners of the panels would have had the panels carved
overseas, regardless of the dutiable rate applied upon reimportation.
Downing clearly had restrictive effects on the legal definition of art. Such
cases made it virtually impossible to classify anything as an art object for
import purposes if that object was utilitarian in nature. This rather arbi-
trary exclusion seems to bear little relationship to the main thrust of cus-
toms duties, which is theoretically to protect American-made goods from
directly competing with foreign made goods.
A wall hanging was considered in Kobata v. United States."° Cus-
toms agents classified hand-painted wooden Japanese screens as dutiable
panels, used chiefly for concealing objects or dividing rooms rather than
as works of art. The importer argued that the screens were to be hung as
paintings and, thus, should be duty-free. The court agreed with the im-
porter, concluding that the screens were chiefly intended to be used as
wall hangings, not as room dividers, since they had hanging devices at-
tached to them.°
0 5
In conjunction with Downing, the Kobata decision created the defi-
nition of art for customs purposes under the TSUS when utilitarian items
were at issue. In the two cases, the conjunction with customs courts
seemed to shift their attention from the issue of foreign competition to a
greater concern for utility. The courts were obviously deferring to the
legislative intent articulated in the tariff schedules to exclude utilitarian
goods. It is difficult, however, to comprehend the rationale for this ex-
clusion. Why would the door carvings in Downing be more likely to
harm U.S. industry than the Kobata panels?
Conceivably, the Downing court could have adopted the copyright
approach of conceptual separability by holding that the artistic crafts-
manship was separate from the utilitarian object, and, therefore, the
doors would have been granted duty-free status. It does not appear,
however, that this approach was considered.
The industrial use exclusion of the TSUS also operated to strictly
limit the definition of art, excluding any article intended for industrial
use from duty-free status. In United States v. J.E. Bernard & Co.," °6 the
plaintiff imported an original oil painting by a recognized French painter
for the purpose of reproducing the painting on the cover of a chemical
manufacturer's trade magazine. The importer argued that, because the
painting had not been created for design or reproduction, it did not fall
104. 326 F. Supp. 1397 (Cust. Ct. 1971).
105. Id. at 1407.
106. 33 C.C.P.A. 166 (1946).
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within the industrial use exclusion. The court, however, held that Con-
gress had intended to make the dutiable status of such objects dependent
upon the intended use after importation, rather than upon the nature of
the object itself.1"7 Apparently, "the painting was taxed because it was
presumed to be competing directly with domestically-produced magazine
cover illustrations. Yet, it seems more likely that the work was repro-
duced on the cover of the magazine to be admired for its artistic merit,
since its content had nothing to do with the chemical industry."' 8
The new Harmonized System completely eliminates any general ref-
erence to exclusions of utility or industrial use. Consequently, it seems
possible that the door panels in Downing could be imported duty-free
under the heading for original engravings; that the Japanese screens in
Kobata would certainly be imported duty-free as paintings; and that the
oil painting imported in J.E. Bernard would be duty-free simply as an oil
painting. The fact that the painting was used for an industrial or utilita-
rian purpose would be irrelevant.
Under the Harmonized System, courts will presumably not be re-
quired to deal with the utilitarian and industrial use issues which the
courts grappled with in Kobata, Bernard and Downing. The new Harmo-
nized System should simplify the importation of works of art and make it
easier for importers to establish duty-free status for works of art which
also serve utilitarian and industrial purposes.
This expanded view considerably changes the legal definition of art
in the customs area. The courts will no longer be required to follow the
restrictive guidelines articulated in Kobata, Bernard, and Downing, and
are likely to include works of utility and industrial use within the defini-
tion of art, assuming that they are sufficiently unique so as not to com-
pete with American-made goods.
3. Ethnographic Objects
Another area of the TSUS which restricted what was classified as
"art" was the section dealing with ethnographic objects of a utilitarian
nature. Under the TSUS, if primitive sculpture was less than fifty years
old and utilitarian, it was excluded.
However, under heading 9705 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule,
duty-free status is conferred upon "collections and collector's pieces of
zoological, botanical, mineralogical, anatomical, historical, archaeologi-
cal, paleontological, ethnographic or numismatic interest."' 0 9 The anno-
tations to heading 9705 explain that the section applies to articles which
107. Id. at 169-70.
108. Duboff, supra note 81, at 65-66.
109. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80, at hdg. 9705.00.00.
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are very often of little intrinsic value, but derive their value from their
rarity, their grouping or their presentation. This would cover articles
having a bearing on the study of the activities, manners, customs and
characteristics of contemporary primitive peoples, for example, tools,
weapons, or objects of worship.
Consequently, heading 9705 seems to eliminate the problem of the
exclusion of primitive sculpture less than fifty years old from duty-free
status. This development, coupled with the elimination of the profes-
sional sculptor requirement of the TSUS, makes it much easier for im-
porters to obtain duty-free status for utilitarian objects less than fifty
years old, which are produced by contemporary primitive peoples. This
new approach greatly expands what customs officials view as works of art
since it is no longer necessary for an importer to go through intellectual
gymnastics to prove that the imported piece is non-utilitarian, or made
by a professional sculptor.
4. Antique Exception
Antiques is one area where the new Harmonized System has not
changed the customs definition of art. Heading 9706 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule confers duty-free status on any antiques which exceed
100 years of age.'1 ° The TSUS also imposed this requirement. Under
both systems, pieces 100 years old or older obtain duty-free status pro-
vided that they retain their original character; this also includes antique
items which have been repaired or restored."' Two recent cases,
although decided under the TSUS, demonstrate the workings of the anti-
ques section.
In Elkins v. United States,"2 a dispute arose over the classification
of three imported carvings, one of coral and two of jade. The importer
claimed that the articles were entitled to enter duty-free as antiques made
prior to 100 years before their date of entry under item 766.25 of the
TSUS or alternatively, as original sculptures under item 765.15 or origi-
nal works of the free fine arts under item 765.25. All of the items were
imported from Singapore and were classified under item 520.61 of the
TSUS as "[o]ther articles not specially provided for, or of semiprecious
stones." The coral carving was assessed at the rate of 21% ad valorem,
while the jade pieces were assessed at the rate of 50% ad valorem under
item 520.61, which deals with precious and semiprecious stones.
The issue was tried by a confrontation of expert testimony. The im-
porter's expert analyzed the style and workmanship of the pieces and
110. Id. at hdg. 9706.00.00.
111. Id.
112. 83 Cust. Ct. 132 (1979).
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"dated the coral carving as 'mid-19th century,' the jade bird carving as
late 18th to early 19th century, and the jade vase as early 19th cen-
tury." 113 The customs expert argued that there were modern tool marks
on the right hand of one of the ladies in the coral bird carving. The court
rejected this argument, however, finding that the modern tool marks
"were attributable to restorers employed to grind down the sharp broken
tail of one of the birds."1 "4 The court found that because the testimony
of the importer's expert was much more persuasive than the expert testi-
mony of the government, the pieces were indeed "made prior to 100
years before their date of entry. '""I5
Elkins demonstrates the extremely important role of expert wit-
nesses in cases involving antiques. Had the importer not hired an expert
of such high caliber, the modern tool mark accusation made by the gov-
ernment might well have gone unchallenged. In addition, Elkins simply
states the general rule for antiques that if the object is more than 100
years old, duty-free status automatically attaches. This rule creates an
interesting result. Presumably, an object of little artistic merit would be
excluded from duty-free status if it were 99 years, 364 days old. How-
ever, upon its 100th birthday, it would automatically obtain duty-free
status.
The rationale for such a result is obviously the consequence of deter-
mining what constitutes duty-free art strictly from an economic point of
view. The Customs Service is not as interested in aesthetic considera-
tions as it is in avoiding damage to U.S. industry from cheap foreign
goods. Presumably, the 100-year rule assumes that once an object be-
comes that old, it is unlikely that it will compete with a product pro-
duced in the United States. That is not necessarily true. If faced with
the choice of an antique clock from England or an identical modern
American reproduction, a consumer is faced with the choice of compar-
ing the price and aesthetics of a foreign-made product to an American-
made product. Objects do not automatically lose their ability to compete
with American-made goods simply because they are 100 or more years
old. Consequently, while the antique exception may make some sense
economically, it is difficult to see how the object is more artistically ac-
ceptable simply because it happens to be 100 years old.
Another area of the antique section where the definition of art plays
an important role is in deciding whether an imported object has been
substantially altered, changing its basic character. The requirement that
the essential character of the piece remain intact operates to limit both
113. Id. at 134.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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the antique exception and what the Customs Service considers to be a
duty-free work of art. The operation of this concept was demonstrated in
Fisher Galleries v. United States.1 6
The Fisher Galleries controversy involved the classification of em-
broidered silk and tapestry remnants imported from the People's Repub-
lic of China. The importer contested the denial of a timely protest filed
with respect to the embroidered goods. The merchandise was classified
by the Customs Service under items 365.91 of the TSUS and assessed a
duty rate of 90% ad valorem, plus 25% ad valorem under item 766.30.
The importer claimed that the items were antiques of the age prescribed
by items 766.20 and 766.25 of the TSUS and, therefore, should be admit-
ted duty-free, even though they were repaired or renovated.
The imported merchandise consisted of both antique embroidered
remnants more than 100 years old and non-antique borders and backings
which were attached to the remnants. The issue before the court was
whether or not the addition of the non-antique borders and backings had
so changed the character and identity of the remnants that they would
now be excluded from their duty-free classification as antiques. The
court carefully dissected the facts of the case, noting that upon arrival in
the plaintiff's gallery, the merchandise would be displayed with the
newer borders and backings apparently attached to protect the remnants
from damage during handling. When the sale of the remnant was real-
ized, the borders and backings would be removed and the remnants set in
either a new border or a special double frame.
The court proceeded to apply the doctrine of the entireties under
which:
[A]rticles are dutiable in their condition as imported and ... the actual
nature of the article of commerce must be taken as the determinant.
Under the doctrine of entireties, where an article is imported as a unit,
but the components retain their individual identities and are not
subordinated to the identity of the combination, duty will be imposed
on the individual entities of the combination as though they had been
imported separately. 1
17
The court concluded that the objects should be imported duty-free, stat-
ing that:
[T]he merchandise involved herein forms no new article having a char-
acter and identity different from either of its parts .... The record
indicates the 'envelopes' are put on with single-stitch sewing and/or
water-soluble glue; that the material for the borders and backings is
selected without regard to artistic enhancement; that all of the borders
and backings which can be accounted for are routinely discarded when
the remnants are mounted and the monetary value of this material is
116. 593 F. Supp. 436 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
117. Id. at 439.
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negligible. . . . Logic dictates the character and identity of articles
ranging in value from $350.00 to $5,000.00 are not changed or altered
by the addition of material having a maximum value of $6.00.' 1
Fisher Galleries demonstrates how the doctrine of the entireties ap-
plies to the duty-free status of imported antiques. Fisher Galleries also
points out that the Customs Service finds maintenance of the artistic in-
tegrity of the original item to be important if an importer seeks duty-free
status for an item as a work of art. If newer materials are added to the
work, which materially alters its character, then the doctrine of the en-
tireties will bar the object from obtaining duty-free status.
5. Other Harmonized System Changes
Other changes under the new Harmonized System also tend to ex-
pand the legal definition of art to include more objects than the TSUS
included.
Heading 9701, which covers paintings, drawings and pastels, now
includes collages and similar decorative plaques, categories previously
not provided for under the TSUS. 9 The collage section covers usage of
bits and pieces of various animal, vegetable or other materials assembled
so as to form a picture or decorative design or motif, but does not include
articles consisting of just a single piece of material, even if mounted or
glued on a backing which may be specifically included in other headings
of the nomenclature such as "ornaments" of plastics, wood, base metal,
or other similar materials. Such articles are classified under their appro-
priate headings. 20
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule narrows duty-free status in one
area under heading 9701. Unlike the TSUS, it provides that "[f]rames
around paintings, drawing, pastels, collages or similar decorative plaques
... are to be treated as forming part of those articles" and classified with
them in this heading only if "they are of a kind and a value normal to
those articles."'' This heading is apparently intended to avoid the prob-
lem which arose under the TSUS where importers would import expen-
sive frames surrounding inexpensive pieces of art in order to obtain duty-
free status. Heading 9701 demonstrates that, where abuses of the duty-
free classification for art are discovered, the Customs Service will not
hesitate to act.
Addressing sculptures, heading 9703 allows to be imported
"[twelve] castings, replicas or reproductions made from a sculptor's orig-
118. Id. at 439-40.
119. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80, at hdg. 9701.00.00.
120. See generally HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80.
121. Id. at ch. 97, note 5.
[Vol. 12:303
inal work or model, by the sculptor himself or by another artist, with or
without a change in scale and whether or not the sculptor is alive at the
time the castings, replicas or reproductions are completed."' 22 In com-
parison, the TSUS section allowed only ten "castings, replicas or repro-
ductions"' 23 to be imported duty-free.
It seems clear that the Harmonized System was designed to simplify
the importation of goods. 24 It has also expanded the definition of art for
purposes of importing items duty-free. The elimination of the profes-
sional sculptor requirement makes it less cumbersome for importers to
prove that a sculpture is a bona fide work of art which should obtain
duty-free status. The elimination of the utility and industrial use exclu-
sions has reduced problems arising from cases such as Downing, Kobata,
and Bernard. Finally, the Harmonized System has eliminated the
problems of importing ethnographic utilitarian objects less than fifty
years old by simply not requiring that the article be non-utilitarian or
non-industrial.
III
State Statutes
In addition to federal legislation and case law on copyright and Cus-
toms Service regulations, several states have enacted laws specifically in-
tended to protect art and artists. The various state statutes define the
term "art" in different ways.
A. Moral Rights Statutes
The doctrine of droit moral, which is the basis for many state moral
rights statutes, is a civil law concept that was first developed in
France.' 25 Since France adopted this law, more than sixty-three nations
122. Id. at ch. 97, Additional U.S. note I.
123. TSUS ANN., supra note 91, at subpt. A, item 765.15.
124. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule permits duty-free entry for some collectibles, as well
as art. For example, heading 9704 confers duty-free status on "postage or revenue stamps...
used or if unused not of current or new issue in the country to which they are destined." Thus,
for purposes of the customs definition of art, the definition apparently has been expanded to
include postage stamps for collectors. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 80, at
hdg. 9704.00.00.
125. L. DUBOFF, THE DESKaOOK OF ART LAW 797 (1977) [hereinafter DESKBOOK OF
ART LAW].
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have recognized the doctrine of droit moral.'26 The droit moral has also
been incorporated in the Berne Copyright Convention.' 27
Under the droit moral, an author has rights over his or her creation,
which generally fall into four classes. The first is the right to create. 128
The artist has the right "to be the sole judge of whether his work is wor-
thy and ready to be placed before the public." '129 The second is deciding
whether or not to disclose a work to the public.' 3 ° This right includes
the right to dispose of a piece of work. Thus, the artist has full control
over the creation and may prevent another from publishing a piece that
the artist has discarded. The third is the right to withdraw a work after
publication. This is applicable, however, only to works published under
contract. 31 The fourth right is name attribution.132 This right is "not
intended to protect [the artist's] reputation so much as to protect the
creative act itself."' 133 As of the date of this Article, eight states have
enacted legislation concerning moral rights: California,134 New York,135
126. See Comment, Copyright. Moral Rights - A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 797
n.47 (1975); copyright statutes found in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (Supp. 1984-86): Argentina, art. 52 (1973) (see art. 83); Australia, §§ 19-21, 57, 68
(1982); Belgium, art. 8 (1958); Brazil, arts. 25, 80-81 (1983); Bulgaria, §§ 3-4 (1972); Canada,
§ 12(7) (1971); Czechoslovakia, §§ 12, 14 (1965); Denmark, § 3 (1977); Egypt, art. 9 (1954);
Ethiopia, arts. 1647, 1665, 1671,,1674(2) (1960); Finland, art. 3 (1986) (see also arts. 26, 51-52);
Federal Republic of Germany, arts. 13-14 (1985); Greece, art. 15 (1943); Hungary, arts. 8-11
(1978); Italy, art. 20 (1981) (see also arts. 21-24, 48, 63); Korea, arts. 14-19 (1957); Mexico, art.
2 (1981) (see also art. 32); Netherlands, arts. 23-25 (1985); Norway, §§ 3, 48 (1974); Poland,
art. 52 (1975); Portugal, art. 56-62 (1985); Romania, art. 3.2, 4 (1968); Sweden, § 3 (1982);
Turkey, arts. 14-17 (1951); United Arab Rebublic, art. 9 (1954); Uruguay, art. 12 (1938) (see
also art. 37); Venezuela, arts. 20-21 (1962); Yugoslavia, art. 29 (1968) (see also arts. 97, 100).
127. Berne Copyright Union (Rome Convention, 1928) in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS
AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1968), item E-1, art. 6 bis. The French have gone further
than the Rome Convention and have granted artists who have registered their work in France
an inalienable 3% resale royalty on works of art. See Leudet et Lefebvre v. Turquin, G.P.
(Trib. Civ. Seine) (1937), cited in Hauser, The French Droit de Suite, The Problem of Protection
for the Underprivileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A 94,
105 n.42 (1959). This pecuniary right is known in France as the droit de suite. Since France
has adopted the droit de suite, Algeria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Italy, Mo-
rocco, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia have followed and
adopted similar legislation. Siegel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights
Act: Their History and Theory, 93 DICK. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988).
128. DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 125, at 798.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 799.
131. Id. at 802.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1990).
135. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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Massachusetts, 13 6  Maine,137  Pennsylvania,'38  Louisiana,139  New
Jersey" 4 and Rhode Island. 141
1. The California Act
The California Art Preservation Act (the "California Act"),'42
passed in 1979, was the first state legislation that offered some protection
for artists' moral rights. The statute limited the definition of works of art
to fine art, defining the term as "original painting, sculpture, or drawing
of recognized quality." '43 In 1982, the California Act was amended to
include an "original work of art in glass," thus including craftspersons in
this medium as producers of fine art for the first time in the United
States.'44 However, works produced under contract for commercial use
were excluded, as well as the works of craftspersons who produced pot-
tery, weaving or woodwork.1 45 The California Act defines "commercial
use" as "fine art created under a work-for-hire arrangement for use in
advertising, magazines, newspapers, or other print and electronic
media."' 46
The qualification of "recognized quality" in the original definition
was an attempt by the legislature to limit the scope of the statute. This
qualification raises obvious problems. The limitation calls for the exer-
cise of judgment without any indication as to how or by what criteria, the
judgment is to be made. The legislature's omission of works of general
artistic craftsmanship has been explained as demonstrating the California
"legislators['] concern only for works embodying art in its highest form,
usually represented by unique non-utilitarian works, the destruction of
which would be a great loss to the cultural heritage of the State." 1 47
The California courts have strictly construed the California Act as
applying only to fine art. In Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. West Oaks Real-
tors, Inc., 48 Jacobs, an architect, agreed to two contracts with the realty
company, providing architectural services for the construction of two
homes on adjacent lots. Jacobs prepared tracings of his plans, filed for
136. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1989).
137. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (1988).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-56 (West 1987).
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1-8 (West 1987).
141. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2-6 (1987).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1990).
143. Id. § 987(b)(2).
144. Id. (see Historical Note, 1982 amends.).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 987(b)(7).
147. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 694 (1982).
148. 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 640; 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1984).
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city approval and applied for a city building permit. Several months
later Jacobs "discovered that the homes were not being built according to
his plans."' 49 Jacobs asserted that his architectural plans were a work of
art and therefore were protected under section 987. The court denied
Jacobs' claim, concluding that architectural plans were not covered
under section 987 of the Civil Code. 150 The court stated that "although
the French droit moral embraces architectural plans (citations omitted),
Jacobs' plans were copies of tracings prepared in a commercial context
and are expressly excluded by section 987. " 151 Jacobs reveals an impor-
tant distinction between the California moral rights statute and French
law-the California Act defines art more narrowly.
In contrast to the rather restrictive California definition, the French
droit moral "applies to virtually all art forms." '152 While the French
droit moral statute does not list those works which are protected, "the
statutory explanations of the rights, interests and protections of droit
moral indicate that its coverage is broad, extending to all tangible or real-
ized expressions of the mind."' 53 The statute applies to music, choreog-
raphy, cinematography, drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture,
engravings and lithography, maps, and photography, among other forms
of expression. 154
As one commentator pointed out, the California Act, which strictly
limits the definition to original paintings, sculptures, or drawings or orig-
inal work in glass of recognized quality, "appears contrary to the spirit of
droit moral" in that it fails to extend protection "to a broader range of
visual arts, [i.e., photography], let alone all other creative efforts."' 55
Indeed, the California Act's limitation to works of "recognized
quality" may deprive certain paintings, sculptures, or drawings of protec-
tion. The California Act contemplates the use of expert testimony to
determine the meaning of recognized quality, yet it has been correctly
suggested that "placing so much weight on the testimony of art 'experts,'
... may . . . discriminate in favor of a sometimes elitist art establish-
ment."' 56 The "recognized quality" requirement seems to bolster "insti-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 644.
151. Id.
152. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 49 (1980).
153. Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in California: A Critical Appraisal, 15 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 29, 44 (1981).
154. Id. at 44 n.74.
155. Id. at 46-47.
156. Id. at 48-49.
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tutionalized bias," under which new and innovative art forms have
always suffered disdain.1 57
The narrow definition of art in the California Act suggests that only
a limited class of art and artists is protected. While the California Act
may be better, than none at all, it is a feeble step in contrast to the all-
encompassing French droit moral.
2 The New York Act
A New York statute protecting artists' authorship rights was first
enacted in 1983, then repealed and reenacted in 1984.158 Similar to the
California Act, the New York statute only applies to certain works of art.
The New York statute covers only those works which constitute "fine
art."' 9 In this context, "fine art" is defined as "a painting, sculpture,
drawing, or work of graphic art, and print, but not multiples."' 6 ° The
New York statute does not cover works of "sequential imagery," and,
thus eliminates motion pictures from coverage.' 6 ' Unlike the California
Act, the New York statute does not require a showing of "recognized
quality." This deletion avoids unnecessary and confusing categorizations
by expert witnesses and is, therefore, a preferable formulation.
Another stark contrast to the California Act is the fact that the New
York statute covers reproductions.' 62 The New York statute protects
reproductions of fine art and photographic print or sculpture of limited
edition multiples "of not more than 300 copies." '163 Consequently, while
the New York statute excludes multiples from its definition of fine art, it
effectively includes them under the protective authorship rights clause.
However, the New York statute contains restrictive clauses that make it
applicable to a narrower class of objects than those covered under the
California Act. For example, the focus of the New York statute on pub-
lic display is in sharp contrast to the California Act, which does not con-
tain a display requirement.
The New York legislature's principal purpose in enacting the Author-
ship Act was to protect the artist's reputation. The narrowness of that
purpose is demonstrated by the limitations on the law's applicability.
Even if a work fits within one of the defined categories of the Author-
ship Act, no protection is available unless the work is "knowingly
displayed in a place accessible to the public, [and] published or repro-
duced in this state." Similarly, the law's protection against alteration
157. Id. at 49.
158. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
159. Id. § 14.03(3)(e).
160. Id. § 11.01(9).
161. Id. § 14.03(1).
162. Id.
163. Id. §§ 11.01(10), (17), 14.01, 14.03(3)(e).
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or mutilation only applies when "damage to the artist's reputation is
reasonably likely to result." In addition, if an altered or mutilated
work is not identified as the artist's, then a cause of action results only
if "it would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist, and
damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to resulttherefrom.'"6
The limitation of the New York statute was recently demonstrated
in Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc. 165 In Tracy, the plaintiff sued under both the
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, as well as the New York authorship
rights statute. The plaintiff contended that the defendants had infringed
his copyright in a logo he had designed for them while under contract.
The plaintiff was a graphic artist engaged by the defendants to paint a
mural for their roller skating rink. The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendants infringed his copyright in the mural by manufacturing and sell-
ing his design as a logo on its merchandise. After a lengthy discussion of
the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, the court concluded that the
cause of action brought under the New York statute was preempted by
the Copyright Act of 1976.166 The court noted that "all equitable or
legal rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright are governed exclusively by federal copyright
law.... [Therefore], the New York Artists Authorship Rights law was
preempted by the Copyright Act because it tracks the rights protected by
the Copyright Act."' 167
The Tracy court failed to explain exactly which rights under the
New York statute were "tracked" by the federal legislation. Instead the
court chose to cite a previous New York case which held that "when
rights defined by the state law would be infringed by an act which, in and
of itself, would infringe one of the rights protected by the Copyright Act,
the state law is preempted."'' 68
A strong argument can be made that the federal district court's con-
clusion in Tracy was erroneous. While it is true that both the New York
statute and the Copyright Act protect artists' rights, the New York stat-
ute goes further by protecting an artist's rights against the knowing pub-
lic display of the artist's work in an altered, defaced, mutilated or
modified form. This right under the New York statute does not depend
on the artist owning a valid statutory copyright.
164. Horowitz, Artists' Rights in the United States: Toward Federal Legislation, 25 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 153, 189-90 (1988).
165. 697 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
166. Id. at 751.
167. Id. at 750-51 (citing Roland Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981,
986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
168. Roland Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Consequently, the plaintiff in Tracy should have argued that the
right defined by the New York statute, which prevents the defacement or
modification and public display of an artist's work, is quite different from
the right created by the Copyright Act. Not only does the New York
statute track the rights given by the Copyright Act of 1976, it specifically
provides for relief based on damage to the artist's reputation. The scope
of this right, therefore, would seem to differ from the general scope of the
Copyright Act, which does not directly address damage to an artist's
reputation.
3. Other State Moral Rights Statutes
As previously noted, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Louisiana have enacted moral rights legisla-
tion. These state statutes are similarly worded and generally define art as
a work of "fine art." The Massachusetts law is typical of these statutes,
defining "fine art" as: "any original work of visual or graphic art of any
media which shall include but not be limited to, any painting, print,
drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph, audio or visual tape, film,
hologram or any combination thereof, of recognized quality., 1 69
All six states use the phrase "but not limited to" in their statutes in
order to provide a broader scope of coverage. Pennsylvania"' and Loui-
siana. 7 include the "recognized quality" language in their moral rights
statutes, thus leaving the door open for litigation to determine exactly
what is meant by "recognized quality." The "recognized quality" re-
quirement is similiar to the provision in the California Act. This could
create many of the same problems discussed under the section on Califor-
nia's moral rights statute. In contrast, Maine, 72 New Jersey, 17 3 and
Rhode Island 74 do not use the "recognized quality" language in their
statutes. Presumably, artists in these states will not be required to prove
the quality of their work before being granted protection.
These six statutes also differ in their treatment of motion pictures.
The Massachusetts statute specifically includes film. 175 In comparison,
the Pennsylvania statute does not specifically mention film, but does state
that "fine art" includes, but is not limited to, a painting, drawing, or
169. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1989).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7) (West 1987).
172. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303.1D (1988).
173. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3 (West 1987).
174. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1987).
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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sculpture.176 Consequently, a broad reading of the Pennsylvania statute
could result in the inclusion of movies.
Conversely, movies are specifically excluded from coverage in
Maine, 177 New Jersey, 178 Rhode Island, t79 and Louisiana. °80 In states
such as Massachusetts, it is foreseeable that the editing of a movie will be
considered a violation of the artist's rights under the statute. Such an
interpretation would almost certainly chill any motion picture industry
activity in Massachusetts and possibly Pennsylvania. Perhaps one of the
reasons states specifically exclude movies from the protection of their
moral rights statutes is to encourage movie-making in their states.
State moral rights statutes also differ in the protection accorded to
editioned works. For example, the Maine statute protects 300 copies of a
limited edition. It provides that a "work of fine art [includes] ... limited
editions of no more than 300 copies." 81 New Jersey, 182 Rhode Island,'83
and Louisiana' 84 also protect 300 copies. Massachusetts 85 and Penn-
sylvania, 8 6 however, do not mention limited edition copies.
Thus, an interesting but rather irrational pattern emerges regarding
the scope of protection provided by the six states. While Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania restrict the scope of their statutes by adding a "recog-
nized quality" requirement and by not providing for editioned pieces,
they may grant some additional protections for motion pictures. In con-
trast, Maine, New Jersey, and Rhode Island appear to take a broader
definitional approach by eliminating the recognized quality language and
protecting 300 limited edition copies. But these states specifically ex-
clude motion pictures from moral rights protection. This probably re-
sults from the states recognizing that the motion picture industry has, in
recent years, been quite active outside of California.
Louisiana specifically excludes movies and imposes the recognized
quality requirement, but also gives protection to 300 limited edition cop-
ies.18 7 Consequently, Louisiana, like the other five states, broadens cov-
erage in one area but narrows the definition by excluding movies and
imposing the "recognized quality" requirement.
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
177. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303.1D (1988).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3 (West 1987).
179. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1987).
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7) (West 1987).
181. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303.1D (1988).
182. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2A:24A-3 (West 1987).
183. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1987).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7) (West 1987).
185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1989).
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7) (West 1987).
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The fact that statutes such as Massachusetts' include works of se-
quential imagery (i.e., motion pictures) creates some interesting litigious
possibilities. In Pennsylvania, where the definition could be interpreted
to include motion pictures but also limits protection to works of "recog-
nized quality," the courts may become embroiled in viewing motion pic-
tures and be forced to make value judgments regarding a film's artistic
merit. The difficulty of this task is best illustrated by the U.S. Supreme
Court's attempts to define what is and is not obscenity in the motion
picture industry.
Open-ended statutory terms such as Pennsylvania's, when coupled
with recognized quality specifications, are at best unfortunate because
they require the courts to make artistic value judgments. At worst, they
appear to be an intentional avoidance of responsibility by the legislatures,
thus leaving the hard decision to the judiciary as to what should and
should not be protected.
B. The California Resale Royalty Act
California is still the only state to enact a statewide Resale Royalty
Act '8 which requires sellers to pay the artist five percent of the amount
obtained from the sale of any work covered by the Act.'89 However, the
statute does not apply to the initial sale by an artist or to resale at any
amount less than either the original purchase price or $1,000. 90 In addi-
tion, the Resale Royalty Act's coverage extends for twenty years after the
artist's death, with the royalties to be paid to the artist's heirs.'
Like the Art Preservation Act,' 9 2 the Resale Royalty Act applies
only to works of fine art.'9 3 The Resale Royalty Act, however, does not
include the "recognized quality" limitation. This is appropriate consid-
ering the embarrassment that the artist's heirs might suffer if they had to
prove that the artist's work fulfilled the recognized quality requirement
before qualifying under the Resale Royalty Act.
C. State Consignment Statutes
Another area of state legislation where the legal definition of art has
become important is gallery consignment statutes. More than 20 states
188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1990).
189. Id. § 986(a).
190. Id. § 986(b)(1), (2).
191. Id. § 986(a)(7).
192. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
193. Id. § 986(a).
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have adopted consignment statutes which establish a fiduciary relation-
ship between an artist and an art dealer.' 94
For consignment purposes, state legislation generally uses a broader
definition of art, unlike the moral rights and resale royalty statutes. The
liberal definition used in the consignment statutes is probably due to a
recognition that legislatures and courts are more familiar with consign-
ment sales than with questions arising out of the relatively new moral
rights statutes. A consignment statute presents the courts with familiar
questions of contract and agency law. The moral rights statutes, on the
other hand, perhaps define art more narrowly because legislatures were
being very cautious about extending moral rights beyond a few well-de-
fined categories.' 95 The extremely narrow definitions in the California
moral rights statute have been attributed to the newness of the concept:
"Obviously, the law cannot suddenly afford a special status to fine arts
without providing the means to delimit its boundaries. The Act's narrow
definition prevents the abuse of newly created moral rights by discourag-
ing those who would be tempted to pursue purely frivolous or self pro-
motional claims."'' 96
There are several formats for the definition of art for purposes of
gallery consignment laws, but two states in particular, Oregon and New
York, stand out as having unique definitions.
1. The Five-Part Rule
The five-part definition, by far the most common statutory scheme,
is typified by Oregon Revised Statute section 359.200(6) which states:
"Fine art" means: (a) an original work of visual art such as a painting,
sculpture, drawing, mosaic or photograph; (b) a work of calligraphy;
(c) a work of original graphic art such as an etching, lithograph, offset
print, silk screen or other work of similar nature; (d) a craft work in
materials including but not limited to clay, textile, fiber, wood, metal,
plastic, glass or similar materials; or (e) a work in mixed media such as
194. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1772 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-73-202
(1987); CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-15-102 (Supp. 1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116S (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 686.502(1) (West Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 140 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 556D.1 (West Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.850(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 104A, § I (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 442.311-14 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 324.03, subdiv. I (West Supp. 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-2-503 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:4 (Supp. 1988); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25C-2
(1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 359.210(2) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1004 (1988); TEX.
Occ. & BUs. CODE ANN. art. 9018, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 18.110.020(2) (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 129.02(1) (West Supp. 1989).
195. Petrovich, supra note 153, at 47-48.
196. Note, The Americanization of Droit Moral in the California Art Preservation Act, 15
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 901, 926 n. 111 (1983).
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a collage or any combination of the art media described in this
subsection. 197
Arizona, 98 Colorado,1 99 Connecticut, 2" Iowa,2 ' Massachusetts,2"2
Montana,20 3 New Hampshire,2 °4 North Carolina,20 5 Tennessee,20 6 Wash-
ington 20 7 and Wisconsin 20 ' all have virtually identical definitions. The
five-part definition of art for gallery consignment law purposes has the
advantage of being relatively specific and reasonably comprehensive.
2. The New York Legislation
The New York legislation takes a different approach and provides
that "the term 'fine art' means a painting, sculpture, drawing, work of
graphic art, photograph or craft work in materials including, but not
limited to, clay, textile, paper, fibre, wood, tile, metal, plastic or glass."20 9
The New York definition incorporates the use of the phrase "but not
limited to," thus, applying a broad-brush approach to the definition. It
should be pointed out that the language "but not limited to" appears to
deal only with the materials involved in a work of art and not with the
actual character of the work of art. Although the New York definition
seems quite broad on its face, it in fact applies only to fine art in the
specified areas and incorporates the "but not limited to" language only
when discussing the materials used to create the work of art.
Comparing the New York definition to the five-part definition, the
New York statute does not appear to cover works such as calligraphy, as
do many of the five-part definition statutes. The five-part definition also
appears to apply a very broad definition of "original graphic art," includ-
ing works "similar in nature." Conversely, the New York statute con-
tains no such language. Additionally, the New York statute does not
particularly mention works in mixed media, although they are not specif-
ically excluded.
The fact that the New York statute does not specifically include
works in mixed media may indicate a desire by the legislature to exclude
197. OR. REV. STAT. § 359.200(6) (1987).
198. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1771(4) (Supp. 1987).
199. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-15-101(4) (Supp. 1989).
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s (West Supp. 1989).
201. IOWA CODE ANN. § 556D.1(2) (West Supp. 1989).
202. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 104A, § 1 (West 1984).
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-2-501(4) (1989).
204. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:3(IV) (Supp. 1989).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25C-1(4) (1989).
206. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1002 (1988).
207. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.110.010 (1989).
208. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 129.01(4) (West 1989).
209. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01 (McKinney 1984).
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these works. The language of the statute does not contain any "catch-
all" phrases such as "but not limited to," except in relation to materials.
This would seem to indicate that, unless works in mixed media can some-
how be fit into one of the enumerated categories, the New York statute
was intended to exclude these works from its coverage.
3. The Michigan Rule
The Michigan rule uses a simple and broad definition of art for its
consignment statute. It states that "fine art means a painting, sculpture,
drawing or work of graphic art.",211 Whether this definition includes col-
lages, calligraphy or mixed media is not clear. The Michigan definition is
a good example of an unfortunately simple and imprecise definition of
art. This type of definitional approach is not as precise as the five-part
definition or New York definition and, therefore, leaves too much discre-
tion to the courts in defining art for consignment purposes.
Minnesota applies a very similar definition to that applied in the
Michigan statute. Minnesota defines art to mean "a painting, sculpture,
drawing, work of graphic art, photograph, weaving or work of craft
art. ' 211 However, the Minnesota statute includes several areas of art
which are not included in the Michigan statute, such as photographs,
weaving and crafts.
4. The Florida Rule
The Florida statute is unique and states:
"Art" means a painting, sculpture, drawing, work of graphic art, pot-
tery, weaving, batik, macrame, quilt, print, photograph, or craft work
executed in materials including but not limited to, clay, textile, paper,
fiber, wood, tile, metal, plastic, or glass. The term shall also include a
rare map which is offered as a limited edition or a map 80 years old or
older; or a rare document or rare print which includes, but is not lim-
ited to, a print, engraving, etching, woodcut, lithograph, or serigraph
which is offered as a limited edition, or one 80 years old or older.212
The inclusion of rare maps, rare documents or rare prints in the Florida
statute is undoubtedly attributable to the large number of such objects in
the Florida area which are apparently sold by dealers.
5. The Texas Rule
The Texas rule is also used by Arkansas and defines art for consign-
ment purposes as "a painting, sculpture, drawing, work of graphic art,
pottery, weaving, batik, macrame, quilt, or other commonly recognized
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 442.321(d) (West 1989).
211. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 324.01, subdiv. 3 (West Supp. 1990).
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 686.501(1) (West Supp. 1990).
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art form." '213 This "commonly recognized" definition is unique to Texas
and Arkansas and appears to be similar to the "recognized quality" re-
quirement found in the California moral rights statute.
The Texas consignment statute's definition of art has been narrowly
interpreted by the courts. In In re Arthur A. Everts Co.,214 the plaintiffs,
two jewelry wholesalers, filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court to lift a
stay against the debtor, a jewelry retailer. The plaintiffs also filed a com-
plaint against a bank asserting that, as consigning suppliers to the debtor,
they had a superior lien position to that held by the bank. The court
disagreed and held that the merchandise consigned to the debtor did not
fall under the definition of art as articulated by the Texas statute. The
court stated that:
[T]here was insufficient proof of the uniqueness of the deliveries. Suchjewelry was reproduced in varying forms by such suppliers. I find that
Plaintiffs' deliveries did not constitute "art" as defined by Article
9018(2)(1). Furthermore, both of the suppliers were corporations and
do not appear to meet the definition of "artists" in said Act. The Act
appears to apply only to individuals, not to corporate suppliers. Addi-
tionally, the debtor, which is a jewelry retail store, does not meet the
criteria of "art dealer" and thus, such suppliers fail to qualify under
article 9018(3).215
Consequently, the Texas court read "uniqueness" into the definition
of art under article 9018. The court does not explain where that concept
originated; it is not articulated in the statute. One can only conclude that
the court, in reading the part of article 9018 which states that art means
"other commonly recognized" art forms, interpreted it to mean that an
art form is not commonly recognized unless it is unique. Everts demon-
strates that even when a statute does not contain limitations such as a
uniqueness requirement, some courts will assume that in order to consti-
tute a work of art an object must somehow be considered "unique."
Although it is unclear exactly why the jewelry in Everts was not
considered as "[an]other commonly recognized art form," the case does
point out a major defect in such a broad and vaguely worded definition.
By leaving it up to the court to determine what is "commonly recog-
nized," the Texas legislature created two problems. First, there is no
suggestion how the court should decide what is a "commonly recog-
nized" art form. This creates the same problem that was discussed
concerning the "recognized quality" section of the California Art Preser-
vation Law. The use of experts may create a bias against innovative
works on the one extreme, and somewhat mundane works (i.e., costume
213. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-73-202 (1987); TEX. Occ. & Bus. CODE ANN. § 9018, § (2)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1989)
214. 35 Bankr. 706 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
215. Id. at 707.
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jewelry) on the other. Secondly, open-ended and vaguely worded legisla-
tion is likely to create more litigation than would be created by a more
precisely worded statute, such as Oregon's law.
Of the five basic methods used to define art for the purposes of con-
signment legislation, the five-part rule is the most comprehensive. It is
very specific regarding the types of objects covered, and does not include
ambiguous phrases such as "other commonly recognized art forms."
This sort of specifically worded statute also avoids excessive and unneces-
sary litigation. The Texas statute, on the other hand, which includes the
ambiguous language of "other commonly recognized art forms," seems
to encourage disagreement over what is commonly recognized and there-
fore may encourage litigation, as evidenced by Everts.216
216. Other state statutes beyond the scope of this study define art in extremely broad lan-
guage. Several states have defined art in relation specifically to the duties of the state art
commission. Generally, these statutes tend to be extremely broad in scope. Three good exam-
ples are Oregon, North Carolina and Minnesota.
The Oregon Arts Commission's definition of art is much broader than the fine art defini-
tion of the consignment statute, stating that:
"Arts" includes, but is not limited to, instrumental and vocal music; dance, drama,
folk art, creative writing and poetry; architecture and landscaping design and the
fields allied to them; painting, sculpture, photography; graphic and craft arts; indus-
trial design; costume and fashion design; motion picture, television, radio; tape and
sound recordings; the history, criticism, theory, and practice of the arts; and the arts
related to the presentation, performance, execution, and exhibition of such art forms.
OR. REV. STAT. § 359.010 (1987). Obviously geared toward a different purpose from the con-
signment statute, the Arts Commission statute clearly attempts to encompass every aspect of
artistic expression in the community including television and radio.
The North Carolina statute, although not as comprehensively specific as the Oregon stat-
ute, is worded almost identically and states that "the term art includes but is not limited to:
music, dance, drama, creative writing, architecture and allied fields, painting, sculpture, pho-
tography, crafts, television, radio and the execution and exhibition of such major art forms."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-403 (1987).
The Minnesota statute has perhaps the most all-encompassing definition, stating that
"'arts' means activities resulting in the artistic creation or artistic performance of works of the
imagination." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 139.07)(a) (West 1979).
In passing it should be noted that state Percent for Arts Acts and Public Art Acts contain
very broad and all-encompassing language as do the art commission statutes. Statutes such as
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit 29, § 42(9) (Supp. 1989)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 27,
§ 4526 (1988)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-75.2-3(a) (1988)), Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 53.517(51)(a) (1985)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 91-503(c)(4) (Harrison
Supp. 1989)), and the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2002(4) (1981)) all contain
phrases such as "but is not limited to" or "but not restricted to," which tend to make the legal
definition of art for purposes of these laws extremely broad.
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IV
Proposed Federal Legislation: The Kennedy Bill
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced S. 1619 (the "Ken-
nedy Bill") in the summer of 1987.217 The Kennedy Bill proposed to
amend the Copyright Act to include a provision protecting artists' moral
rights and providing for artists' resale royalty rights.218
The Kennedy Bill recognized "the implicit originality of individual
works of fine art, the public benefit of encouraging a creative working
environment for artists, [and] the national responsibility to enrich and
enliven our cultural heritage."2 9 The Kennedy Bill required a "showing
of grossly ngligent or intentional conduct resulting in 'the significant or
substantial distortion, mutilation, or other alteration' of a publicly dis-
played work."22° In this respect, the Kennedy Bill was very similar to
the New York moral rights statute which requires a public display before
a cause of action arises. However, under the Kennedy Bill the public
display requirement was not necessary if the work was actually de-
stroyed.22' This aspect of the Kennedy Bill was similar to the California
statute, which also does not require a public display in order for a cause
of action to arise.
It should be noted that the Kennedy Bill only applied to works of
"fine art" and, like the California statute, the quality determination was
left to the trier of fact.222 That determination would apparently be
"based upon the 'opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art,
curators of art museums, restorers, curators of fine art,' " and other pro-
fessionals.223 Additionally the Kennedy Bill contained the quality limita-
tion of the California Act and the public display limitation (except for
destruction) of the New York statute. The bill was obviously a good
faith effort on the part of Senator Kennedy to protect artists' moral and
economic rights. The "recognized quality" and "public display" require-
ments, however, are both unnecessary impediments to successful litiga-
tion by aggrieved artists. The Kennedy Bill died in Committee before the
end of the legislative session.
On June 16, 1989, Senator Kennedy introduced S. 1198 (the "1989
Kennedy Bill"),224 a revision of his previous bill, S. 1619. Four days
217. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also Horowitz, supra note 164, at 153.
218. Id. at 153-54.
219. Id. at 203 (citing S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
220. Id.
221. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987).
222. See Horowitz, supra note 164, at 203.
223. Id.
224. VISUAL ARTISTS' RIGHTS ACT OF 1989, S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
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later, Representative Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) introduced a companion bill,
H.R. 2690.225 While the two bills contain similar provisions, there are
several differences between them and their predecessor. The resale roy-
alty provision of the Kennedy Bill is not included in either S. 1198 or
H.R. 2690. However, both bills mandate a study to determine the feasi-
bility of a federal resale royalty.226
Both bills contain two important components of moral rights:227 the
right of attribution 228 and the right of integrity. 229 Both bills provide a
limited right of integrity for those who create works of visual art which
have been incorporated into or made part of a building.23°
225. VISUAL ARTISTS' RIGHTS ACT of 1989, H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. E2199-201 (daily ed. June 20, 1989).
226. S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 9.
227. Leiser & Spiessback, Artists' Rights: The Free Market and State Protection of Personal
Interests, 9 PACE L. REV. 1, 12 (1988). See generally DaSilva, supra note 152.
228. S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 3(a). Traditionally, what has been con-
sidered to be the right to paternity was composed of: (1) the right to be credited as the author
of one's own work; (2) the right not to have one's name attached to a work which one does not
acknowledge to be one's own, and (3) the right to enjoin a third person from substituting his or
her name for that of the creator. See DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 125, at 802-03. The
1989 Kennedy and Kastenmeier Bills provide the author of a "visual work of art" with the
right: (1) to claim authorship of their works; (2) "to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create;" and (3) "the right to prevent
the use of his or her name as the author of a work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation or other modification of [the] work." S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25,
§ 3(a)(1), (2). The bills also cover the right of integrity. Noticeably lacking from these rights
are the rights to enjoin third parties from claiming authorship of the author's work and to
disclaim authorship of a work created by him or her but not acknowledged as such. U.S.
courts have provided some protection against both through use of the doctrine of unjust en-
richment. See Leiser & Spiessback, supra note 227, at 21-25. Further, the buyer of a work
which has been falsely attributed to a third party may also bring an action against the seller.
See DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 125, ch. XI.
229. S. 1198 and H.R. 2670, supra notes 224-25, § 3(a)(3). The right of integrity contained
in both bills provides an author of a work of visual art "the right to prevent any destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of either (1) a work that "would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation," or (2) "a work of recognized stature." S. 1198, supra note
224, § 3(a)(3)(A), (B); H.R. 2690, supra note 225, § 3(a)(3). While the 1989 Kennedy Bill has
a separate subsection defining when a work is of recognized stature, the Kastenmeier Bill pro-
vides that destruction or mutilation or any other modification of a work of recognized stature
constitutes prejudice to the honor and reputation of the author of that work. Furthermore, the
1989 Kennedy Bill provides that "any intentional or grossly negligent distortion, mutilation,
or modification of the work is a violation of [the] right," while the Kastenmeier Bill deems
"any such destruction, distortion, mutilation, or modification of [the] work ... a violation of
[the] right" without regard to fault. S. 1198, supra note 224, § 3(a)(3)(B); H.R. 2690, supra
note 225, § 3(a)(3). Both bills provide that changes in a work of visual art due to the mere
passage of time or conservation efforts are not considered mutilation, destruction or modifica-
tion of the work. S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 3(c)(1), (2).
230. S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 4. The right to integrity does not apply
to art which "has been incorporated into or made part of a building" if both the artist and
owner of the building have "consented to the installation of the work in the building" in a
written agreement signed by both parties, and the art is not removable without some destruc-
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To be considered as a work of visual art under either of the bills,
three criteria must be met: first, the work must be a "painting, drawing,
print, sculpture, or still photographic image;" second, the work must be
"produced for exhibition purposes only;" and third, the work must exist
"in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer, or in the
case of a sculpture, in multiple-cast[ings] . . . of 200 or fewer." 23' If a
work meets all of these requirements and does not fall into a number of
exceptions, the artist is entitled to the rights set forth in the bills.
The bills contain a definition of "works of visual art" because pre-
ceding bills contained less precise definitions,232 and due to the desire to
limit the Bill's application to those "artists whose works of art have been
allowed to fall through the existing gaps in our copyright laws."'233 The
bills also cover the "fine art of photography, a very limited class of still
photographic images produced for exhibition purposes in galleries and
museums." '234 The bills further provide that evidence of commercial ex-
ploitation of a work does not exclude the work from the protection af-
forded to works produced "for exhibition purposes. ' 235
The definition of "work of visual art" contained in both bills has
several express exceptions. The first reiterates the number requirement
for copies or limited editions. 236 The second exception is a laundry list of
items which will not be considered works of visual art.2 37 Any work
tion, distortion, mutilation, or modification. Id. § 4(d)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The agreement can pro-
vide some right to integrity but such an agreement is not enforceable against a subsequent
owner without notice. Id. § 4(d)(1)(A)(ii), (B). The bills also provide that "if the owner of a
building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a part of [the] building and which can
be removed . . . without destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification," the au-
thor's right of integrity shall apply. However, if the owner is unable to locate the author after
making a "diligent good faith effort," or if the author refuses to pay the expenses of removal
after receiving notice of the owner's intention, then the author's right of integrity shall not
apply. Id. § 4(d)(2). The Copyright Office may record the identities and addresses of authors
whose works of visual art have been incorporated into buildings. Id. § 4(d)(3).
231. Id. § 2.
232. 135 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
233. Id. See also Press Release of Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Oct. 17, 1989.
234. 135 CONG. REC., S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
235. Section 3(a)(3)(B) of S. 1198 provides that "[e]vidence of commercial exploitation of a
work as a whole, or of particular copies, does not preclude a finding that the work is a work of
recognized stature." This language is taken directly from the Kennedy Bill as originally intro-
duced. S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 9, 1986).
236. S. 1198 and H.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 2(1). Exception (1) reads "any version
that has been reproduced in other than such limited edition prints or cast sculptures." Id.
237. Id. § 2(2). Exception (2) reads "(A) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audio visual work, book, magazine, peri-
odical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication or similar publication;
(B) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging
material or container; [and] (C) any portion or part of any item described in subparagraph (A)
or (B)." Id.
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made for hire is excluded from the definition of work of visual art under
the third exception. 23 ' The fourth exception excludes any work derived
from a work outside of the statutory definition. 239 Finally, the bills ex-
clude "any work not subject to copyright protection under section 102"
of the Copyright Act.2 ' The exceptions to the definition of works of
visual art were added to the present bills to reinforce the objective of not
granting such rights to works which are "not subject to copyright protec-
tion under title 17 of the United States Code."' 24 ' Unfortunately, the
legal definition of art contained in both bills is narrower than that found
in the Copyright Act. Thus, some artists who may have copyright pro-
tection for their works will not enjoy the benefits of the moral rights of
attribution and integrity if these bills are enacted.
V
Conclusion
As the case law and statutes clearly indicate, the legal definition of
art greatly depends upon who is doing the defining. The copyright defi-
nition results from a concern over conferring only enough protection so
as not to stifle economic competition and the free flow of trade. Distinct
from that definition is the customs approach which seeks to insure that
duty-free status is not conferred on objects that might actively compete
with American-made goods.
The state moral rights laws express a concern for the protection of
artists' rights. This concern results in a definition which emphasizes the
protection of bona fide works of "fine art." However, some states also
238. Id. § 2(3). The Copyright Act defines a work made for hire as either
a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or a
work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audio visual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). In the hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on a prior
version of the Kennedy Bill, Senator Kennedy offered that works for hire were implicitly ex-
cluded from the bill's coverage because the copyright in those works belonged to the employer.
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copy-
rights and Trademarks of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1987)
(statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). Rather than implicitly excluding such works, the
present bills contain an express limitation with respect to works for hire. See S. 1198 and H.R.
2690, supra notes 224-25.
239. S. 1198 and R.R. 2690, supra notes 224-25, § 2(4). Exception (4) excludes "any repro-
duction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection with any
item described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)." Id.
240. Id. § 2(5).
241. 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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impose the dubious "recognized quality" test. Some states, such as Mas-
sachusetts, cover moving pictures, while others specifically exclude this
type of work from their statutory definition. Very little definitional com-
mon ground can be found in this broad body of legal subject matter. A
few common threads do, however, exist.
First, all of the legislation requires some sort of originality on the
part of the creator before the work will be considered art. For the copy-
right definition, this requirement takes on the guise of "minimal original-
ity." For customs purposes, the originality requirement is couched in
terms of "uniqueness," which prevents competition with domestically
created goods. Most of the state moral rights statutes use the word
"original" or its equivalent in order to assure that they are protecting a
bona fide work of art. State consignment statutes also use the originality
test, as Everts demonstrates, to prevent people such as jewelry wholesal-
ers from claiming that their wares are works of art.
Second, the legal definitions applied by the various laws all express
concern over the breadth of the definition of art. Requirements such as
"minimal originality," "conceptual separability," "fine art," and "recog-
nized quality" all point to one conclusion. When copyright, customs,
and state statutes confer a special status on works of art, the primary
goal has been to narrowly limit what objects fall into the protected cate-
gories to prevent the law from being used for unintended purposes. For
example, the California Art Preservation Act, which protects some
moral rights of artists, provides a narrow definition of what is covered. If
the definition were an extremely broad one, as in France, one could fore-
see a situation where a lawsuit would be brought because graffiti is re-
moved from a restroom wall. This is probably not a desired goal of a
moral rights statute.
Such concerns, on the other hand, have led some definitional ap-
proaches, such as the customs approach under the TSUS, to make some
dubious distinctions concerning what is art. Why a beautifully engraved
door, such as the one in Downing, is not a work of art is difficult to
explain. Hopefully, the new Harmonized System's elimination of the
utilitarian and industrial use exclusion from the duty-free status require-
ments will eliminate this problem.
A universal legal definition of art probably cannot go much further
than stating that a work of art is an original expression of the creator,
embodying a creative process in which the creation is distinctively the
work of that creator. A more precise definition, although desirable,
would not do justice to the diverse interests involved.
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